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This special issue of the International Community Law Review hosts selected 
papers from a conference on international customary law that I co-organised in 
July 2015 as a member (at the time) of the McCoubrey Centre for International 
Law. Custom is a “mysterious” source of international law.1 Every generation of 
lawyers has painstakingly strived to demystify it, by explaining its formation 
and by endeavouring (in vain?) to encapsulate it in such a way so that it fits 
into the tidy “boxes” and “channels” through which law is formally constructed 
by society, its subjects and their institutions. Yet, the inherent spontaneity2 of 
a construct that emerges from the society (through conduct of its members 
that, somehow, transforms itself into a legal rule) is in sharp contrast with the 
very premises and physiognomy of posited law that promises certainty (as to 
its validity and content) through formalism. Perhaps customary law and legal 
positivism make odd bedfellows. Or it may simply be that lawyers (even the 
greatest among them) do not possess the tools (i.e. methodological equip-
ment) that would allow them to “tame” customary law.
* I wish to thank the ICLR for hosting the papers on international customary law published in 
this issue, its Editor-in-Chief, Professor Malgosia Fitzmaurice, its Managing Editor, Dr Sarah 
Singer, the authors contributing to the issue, the ILC Special Rapporteur, Sir Michael Wood, 
Mr Omri Sender, the anonymous reviewers and, last but not least, the McCoubrey Centre for 
International Law.
1   Prosper Weil, “Le droit international en quête de son identité”, 237 Recueil des cours de 
l’Académie de droit international de La Haye (1996) p. 161 and Georges Abi-Saab, “Cours 
général de droit international public”, 207 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit internatio-
nal de La Haye (1996) pp. 174–175.
2   Among others, Roberto Ago, “Science juridique et droit international”, 90 Recueil des cours 
de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye (1957) pp. 851 and following and especially 
pp. 932 and following.
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I am mindful of the fact that one may react to this rather pessimistic 
(albeit realistic) introduction by questioning the overall value and usefulness 
of this issue. However, the tone of the opening paragraph to this brief intro-
ductory note is not one that should discourage the reader. Quite the opposite, 
it should be perceived as an open invitation to everyone interested in interna-
tional customary law to read the studies contained in this special issue with a 
critical eye and an open mind to the varied and divergent (methodological) 
approaches that underpin them. It is also meant as an explanation of why the 
papers selected for publication in this issue, whilst topical – insofar as each 
of them engages with the works of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
on the identification of international customary law – all move (in one way or 
another) beyond the confines of legal formalism and question the definition 
and innate foundations of international custom. Their value is not (only) in the 
arguments they make or in the answers they offer, but in the questions they are 
raising regarding international customary law and its formation and validity 
as law. What is it after all that changes social conduct into a norm (i.e. a legal 
rule)? And what is the bedrock of its normativity and binding force?
The first paper in this issue, by Noora Arajärvi, offers a very topical tour 
d’horizon of the works of the ILC on customary law and navigates us through 
the views expressed by all involved actors, including the Special Rapporteur and 
states participating in the discussions taking place within the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA). Arajärvi engages critically with the ILC documents 
and links the issues they raise with principal arguments in legal theory on the 
formation of international customary law. Her analysis spans a wide variety 
of aspects of customary law, from the role played by UNGA resolutions to the 
persistent objection doctrine. A topic occupying a central place in her analysis 
is the two-element test, which is at the heart of the debate on “traditional” and 
“modern” customary law, with the latter approach prioritising (a certain per-
ception of) opinio juris to the detriment of state practice. This approach is seen 
by its proponents as a more appropriate method for the formation of custom, 
especially in certain areas of international law, such as human rights, that aim 
at protecting the general interest (i.e. interests of the international community 
as a whole). Arajärvi concurs in that respect with the ILC and rejects modern 
custom, favouring legal certainty and the unity of international law across its 
various regimes.
In contrast with Arajärvi’s all-encompassing analysis, Khagani Guliyev’s 
study focuses on particular custom. The author contributes to scholarship be 
arguing against the common perception that – unlike general international 
custom – particular customary law owes its normativity to the consent of the 
states that it binds. Both these types of law, i.e. general and particular custom, 
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are binding because of practice believed/accepted to be law. However, the tacit 
agreement theory might not be totally irrelevant to the extent that particular 
customary law contains certain features that bring it closer to contracted law 
(reflecting the will of states) in case of state succession. To support his novel 
argument, Guliyev proceeds with a thorough comparison between particular 
custom and treaty law in the context of state succession.
The next three studies in this issue concern the impact of actors other-
than-states on international customary law. The first such paper is written by 
Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli and discusses non-state actors. Mindful of state-
centrism in international law making, the author is cautious not to challenge 
the positivist orthodoxy in international customary law. However, his analysis 
invites us to go beyond formalism and acknowledge the influence of non-state 
actors in the making of customary law, in the course of their wide-ranging 
interactions with it, when, for instance, they use or interpret it. Constrained as 
it may be by state-centrism, the conduct of non-state actors (“filtered” through 
and presented as state conduct) is essential for both practice and opinio juris. 
Among other reasons, this is due to the expertise and the power of (some) 
non-state actors. Empirically speaking, their role and impact might be proven 
to be significantly more effective than the lens of formalism allows us to per-
ceive. Finally, moving beyond empirical analysis, Carrillo-Santarelli engages 
in a normative (i.e. deontological) discussion about the desirable engagement 
(and the formal effects that ought to be given to it) of non-state actors in the 
making of customary law. The conclusion reached is that states should occa-
sionally endorse/recognise the law making power of non-state actors, when 
this is justified against criteria such as the interests at stake and the expertise 
of non-state actors.
Sufyan Droubi’s analysis may be seen as complementary with that of 
Carrillo-Santarelli. The focus in his study is on international organisations and, 
in particular, on the UN. Unlike Carrillo-Santarelli, Droubi avoids normative 
(de lege ferenda) arguments and focuses on empirical observation through the 
lens of sociological constructivism. The criterion of the attribution of custom-
ary practice to member states or to the organisation itself is given lesser weight, 
as the paper invites us to observe (beyond the constraints of formalism, which 
may be accused of disregarding the reasons behind social conduct) that insti-
tutions such as the UN are not merely agents of states. They do influence states 
(by applying also pressure against those states that oppose a rule), while acting 
as norm-entrepreneurs that articulate norms binding the international com-
munity. This type of law making process involves a number of stages that are 
discussed in the study at a theoretical level, but also in the context of custom-
ary law, both in abstract and through a case study.
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The last main paper in this issue is written by Panos Merkouris who dis-
cusses the role of international judges in the interpretation of the (customary 
rules) on interpretation. Armed with the strict rules of logic, Merkouris mas-
terfully demonstrates that such rules are susceptible to judicial interpretation 
and, most importantly, that this is an intellectual exercise that should not be 
confused with the identification of custom by judges. For Merkouris, induction 
is the course of reasoning to be followed for the identification of a customary 
rule (i.e. to establish its existence as a valid legal rule), as opposed to deduction 
that is apposite for interpretation pertaining to the content of a rule, once it 
has been identified as a rule.
The role of judicial interpretation in the making of international customary 
law is a question to which I will return. But before that, the overview of the 
contents of this issue will not be complete without highlighting that it has the 
privilege to include a concluding note written by Sir Michael Wood, who is 
the ILC Special Rapporteur on the topic of the identification of international 
customary law. The note comments on the five aforementioned studies from 
the perspective of the ILC draft conclusions on the identification of customary 
law and demonstrates that, in spite of any points of divergence that may exist 
between the scholarly work published in this issue and the works of the ILC, 
the framework established by the latter is wide enough to encompass (most 
of) the arguments put forth by the authors in this issue. The enduring arche-
typal definition of customary law to which the ILC subscribes is flexible and 
wide enough, in the sense that state-centrism only regards the formal require-
ments for the identification of custom, without necessarily rejecting (or being 
per se incompatible with) the social drivers and forces behind state practice 
and opinio juris. The fact that (for the sake of formalism – to the extent that 
formalism is possible in the case of customary law) the social forces (by actors) 
surrounding, inspiring and shaping state practice and opinio juris are not to be 
formally taken into account neither means that they do not exist, nor nullifies 
their (indirect) impression on customary law.
But state-centrism (and the associated question of the role of other-than-
states actors in international customary law) is one only of the threads con-
necting the studies contained in this issue. Another common thread is the 
role of sovereign will in custom making. A common misconception is that in-
ternational legal positivism (i.e. the idea that the law is posited, as opposed 
to natural law explanations of the validity of law that may see it as God-given, 
associated with morality or deriving from recta ratio) is associated with state 
will only and the idea that the law is binding upon sovereign states because 
(and only if) they consent to it. Admittedly, this lens, corresponding to the vol-
untarist strand of international legal positivism, is the prevailing one. However, 
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leaving aside the variations that exist within international legal voluntarism, 
the misconception discussed here ignores the diversity of strands that exists 
within international legal positivism. If for Anzilotti international customary 
law is a tacit agreement,3 for Scelle, who rejects the idea of sovereignty,4 the 
normative foundations of custom stem from the needs of the international 
community (encompassing non-state actors).5 And, if for Kelsen the bind-
ing force of customary law is hypothetical6 and cannot be explained7 as it 
coincides8 with the foundational (extra-legal) rule of the international legal 
order, namely pacta sunt servanda (which, according to this theory is custom-
ary in nature and serves as the source of normativity of treaty law, giving a 
higher hierarchical status to custom compared to treaties9), Hart associates 
customary law with the function of judges and courts,10 who (one may add) 
cover the absence of a rule of recognition in the (rather primitive and decen-
tralised) international legal system.11
Seen from that perspective, each paper contained in this study makes a con-
tribution to the positivist foundations of customary law and to the fundamen-
tal question of whether custom owes its normativity to the will of the states it 
binds and whether it can be understood as a tacit agreement. It appears that all 
authors in this issue concur (and some of them explicitly state) that custom-
ary law is not the product of and does not acquire a binding force because of 
state consent. This is yet another point of convergence between the studies 
in this issue and the ILC. The latter is not dealing with this issue in detail, as 
it has chosen not to focus per se on the formation of customary law, but on 
3    Dionisio Anzilotti, Cours de droit international (re-edition, 1999) pp. 73–79.
4    Georges Scelle, Cours de droit international public 1948, pp. 23 and 99 and following.
5    Scelle’s theory is called sociological objectivism. For an introduction, Patrick Daillier and 
others, Droit international public (8th edition, 2009) pp. 91 and 116–118. On social neces-
sity, and morality and power Georges Scelle, Cours de droit international public, Les cours 
de Droit (1947–1948) pp. 11 an following and especially pp. 36–38. Especially regarding the 
power of custom to be imposed against state will, Georges Scelle, Précis de droit des gens 
(Principes et systématiques) (Vol. II, 1934) p. 298.
6    Hans Kelsen, “Théorie du droit international public”, 84 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de 
droit international de La Haye (1955) p. 129.
7    Hans Kelsen, “Théorie du droit international coutumier”, in C. Leben C. (ed.), Hans Kelsen: 
écrits français de droit international (2001) p. 65.
8    Ibid., p. 67.
9    Hans Kelsen, “Théorie du droit international public”, n. 6, p. 129.
10   Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1994) p. 46.
11   Ibid., pp. 235, 214 and, on the effects of recognition, pp. 94 and following, and especially 
pp. 100 and following.
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its identification – although, admittedly, the latter partially overlaps with the 
former. Yet, the ILC explicitly rejects state consent as the basis of custom and 
“translates” (excluding the sive necessitatis part of the maxim) opinio juris as 
“acceptance as law”.12
The reason why the ILC focuses on the identification of customary rules, 
rather than opting for a broader scope, is because its aim is to offer authorita-
tive guidelines to those who employ custom.13 International judges are not the 
only addressees, but they are among them. One could even argue that they 
are high on the list of addressees as international courts have the authority 
to identify the law. This brings me to the last point I wish to make in this brief 
introductive note. This point concerns the role of international judges and ties 
quite well with the paper by Merkouris. As I have argued elsewhere,14 interna-
tional judges and their courts are vital for international custom making. My 
argument goes beyond Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice that recognises case law as a means for the determination of the law. In 
all legal systems, but (because of decentralisation, and the absence of a central 
legislator and rule of recognition) especially in international law, judges need 
to identify the law. This means that they recognise its existence and validity. 
While doing so, and to do so they need to interpret the definition of interna-
tional customary law, which, as such, is a systemic rule, that is to say, a “proto-
norm”, a “matrix” for the establishment of other norms. Custom as a source of 
international law corresponds to a rule of international law, which, as all rules 
of law, is susceptible to interpretation. Thus, while interpreting custom as a 
source of law (so that they can decide on the criteria they will use to identify a 
customary rule, i.e. the normative output of the source), international judges 
define what custom is. This way they (co-)shape the definition of customary 
law (as a source of law). Judges should/do not create customary rules. These 
12   ILC, A/71/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-eighth 
session, 2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016, p. 82 in footnote 252.
13   ILC, A/67/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-fourth 
session, 7 May to 1 June and 2 July to 3 August 2012, p. 114, para. 199 (referring to the views 
of the Special Rapporteur). See also A/CN.4/653, International Law Commission, sixty-
fourth session, “Formation and evidence of customary international law. Note by Michael 
Wood, Special Rapporteur”, p. 6, para. 24.
14   Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, “Juris Dicere: Custom as a Matrix, Custom as a Norm, and the Role 
of Judges and (their) Ideology in Custom Making”, in N. Rajkovic and others, Power of 
Legality: Practices of International Law and their Politics (2016) pp. 188–208 and Vassilis 
P. Tzevelekos, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “International Custom Making and the ECtHR’s 
European Consensus Method of Interpretation” 16 European Yearbook of Human Rights 
(2016) pp. 313–344.
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are the product of the society. But they have the authority to and enjoy dis-
cretion in interpreting/defining custom as a source/matrix for the creation of 
customary rules. This way they may also influence customary rules.
As already explained, the task of the ILC is to provide authoritative guidance 
on the identification of customary law.15 However, irrespective of the project’s 
“label” (i.e. identification of customary law), the work of the ILC may limit judi-
cial discretion in the definition of custom. This is so because the identification 
of customary law involves defining custom as a source of law. Arguably, this 
is what prompted the ILC to explain (albeit en passant) that customary law is 
not dependent on state consent, but on the acceptance of the normative force 
of customary law, i.e. the belief that social conduct (practice) has been trans-
formed into a legal obligation.16
But, if this is true and the ILC is indeed (to some degree) defining custom 
as a source of law, restricting thereby (to the extent that it can restrict) the 
discretion of international courts to define that source, then the question to 
ask is how tight the “straightjacket” it creates should really be. How far should 
the ILC go with its definition of custom? For instance, how many states should 
participate in custom making? How many states should believe that social 
conduct has acquired a normative force? And how thorough should a court’s 
comparative analysis be before it is in a position to identify sufficient custom-
ary practice?17 These are questions pertaining not only to the methodology 
for the identification of customary law, but to its definition as a source of law 
as well. These are also questions that are, to some extent, left unanswered by 
the ILC, presumably because it does not wish to compromise the inherently 
flexible nature of customary law.18 This is a choice that one may agree or dis-
agree with. But, to make an informed decision, one needs to understand that 
the more inflexible custom is, the more concretely it is defined, the less dis-
cretion (i.e. power to co-construct it) judges will enjoy – and vice versa. Or, 
put differently, the balance maintained between flexibility and inflexibility in 
15   See n. 13.
16   See n. 12.
17   A comparison could be made with the European consensus method of interpretation of 
the European Court of Human Rights when it examines in a comparative way the prac-
tice of the states under its jurisdiction with a view to identify evolution in the standards 
of human rights protection that they apply. European consensus is not a method for the 
establishment of custom. Nevertheless, to the extent that it relies on state practice, it 
raises similar questions to the ones applying in the context of the identification of cus-
tomary rules by courts. See Tzevelekos and Dzehtsiarou, n. 14.
18   ILC, A/67/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-fourth 
session, 7 May to 1 June and 2 July to 3 August 2012, p. 110, para. 171.
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customary law translates into a balance of power between states (that create a 
rule) and judges (who identify it, co-shaping thereby the definition of custom 
as a source of law).
That being argued, the questions to leave you with are the following. How 
much detailed should ILC’s definition of custom be? Isn’t it enough that it re-
inforces the two-element theory – or, maybe, we need a more comprehensive 
“roadmap” on customary law? But also – if I am allowed to become a bit more 
provocative-, how much are we ready (especially in times of rising extremism 
and nationalism, even in western countries with a long democratic tradition) 
to leave to states and how much to judges – particularly in areas of law aim-
ing to safeguard community values? Which translates into a slightly different 
question: how much of the existing customary law would we really be willing 
to “sacrifice” for the purposes of legal certainty, achieved through a more in-
flexible (thus rare to identify) custom that would require an in-depth, exhaus-
tive comparative examination of state practice and opinio juris?
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